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Abstract
Industries are transformed by the adoption of exible production technologies and com-
plementary changes in rmsorganization. Some of the results of this transformation include
companies extending their product lines and reshaping their relationships with outside part-
ners. In this paper I analyze how the structure of the upstream industry inuences upstream
manufacturersdecisions regarding the choice of production technologies that enable them to
extend product variety. The results of a theoretical model with two pairs of supply chains in
which producers procure inputs from either two or a single supplier reveal that the benets
of new technologies to manufacturers might be eroded. In particular, an increased intra-
brand competition and the introduction of inter-brand competition have adverse e¤ect on
producerspayo¤s. Eventually, the choice made by downstream manufacturers departs from
the socialy optimal outcome.
Keywords: exible production technology, merger, supply chain, vertical relations.
JEL-Classication: L12, L14, L25
1 Introduction
In this paper I analyze the interplay between the value chain organization, the adoption of
exible production technologies (FPT) leading to more product variety and welfare implications
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of such actions. In order to link the characteristics of FPT with the rm scope and supplier
relations, I develop a theoretical model that allows for an analysis of suppliers incentives to
merge and manufacturers decisions regarding the choice of production technologies that are
specic to inputs produced by suppliers. Choosing FPT over dedicated production technology
(DPT) allows a manufacturer to gain access to inputs necessary to extend its product variety.
Two questions are of major importance here: First, how does the structure of the upstream
industry, market size and the degree of product di¤erentiation a¤ect producers incentives to
adopt FPT? Second, what are the welfare implications of the decisions regarding investments in
the production technologies under di¤erent structures of the upstream industry?
The motivation for this paper is the technological shock that, over the last two decades,
has lead to a reorganization of value chain structure and that moves industries away from mass
production to mass customization. Flexible machines and multitasking production equipment
replace specialized and single-purpose equipment. Because FPT can be reprogrammed quickly,
they can be seen as an ability to produce several products in a single plant or on a single
assembly line at a low cost, relatively to the specialized equipment designed for mass production
of homogeneous products (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). Consequently, modern manufacturing
is being transformed by the adoption of FPT and complementary changes in rms strategy
and organization. In particular, FPT enable rms to change their strategies and the way they
organize their activities within and between organizations. New strategies include broadening
product lines, frequent product introductions and improvements. Such behavior is consistent
with the argument that, as rms seek to escape competition, implementing technologies that
allow for extending product line and increasing product variety is a major point of emphasis in
the quest for additional prots (Lancaster (1990)). Regarding organizational changes, a rms
processes, internal structure, and the relationships with outside partners are strongly inuenced
by its product strategy and technology in place (Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)). Consequently, value
chain characteristics and production technology have a considerable impact on the competition
in the input and product markets and, eventually, on welfare.
To model the interplay between value chain organization, technology and increasing product
variety, regarding the technology characteristics, I follow the assumptions made by Röller and
Tombak (1990). In a linear framework, they model FPT as a technology that enables rms
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to produce parallel two products instead of only one. According to their results, investing
in FPT leads to more competition and subsequently reduces prices and prots of both rms.
Their conclusion is that exibility is detrimental to rmsprots and companies are better-o¤
when they remain one-product monopolists. Furthermore, although more exibility leads to the
transfer of surplus from producers to consumers, parallel production of both goods is desirable
from the social point of view only when products are enough di¤erentiated (Gupta (1998)).
An alternative treatment of exible production technologies can be found in Eaton and
Schmitt (1994). They use a Hotelling model in which they describe the e¤ects of new production
system on rmsability to lower the cost of product customization and the cost of switching
the production process from one variant to another. The focus of their analysis is, however,
di¤erent from the one of the current work. In their work, they study the implications of exible
manufacturing systems for market structure and nd that they promote concentration through
preemption and mergers. By using a similar approach, Norman and Thisse (1999) arrive to a
conclusion that the monopoly preemption is still feasible, but it will lead to excessive product
variety.
Concerning the vale chain dimension, I follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) who model a
duopoly in which producers buy inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. This
setting reects the vertical relations modelled in this paper in a state when both downstream
rms use dedicated technologies. Analyzing horizontal mergers, they nd that the distribution
of bargaining power might have important implications for merger incentives. For example, in
contrast to the nding of this paper, they argue that under some conditions duopoly structure
might be prot maximizing for the upstream industry. Following this line of analysis, Milliou
and Petrakis (2005) modify the bargaining setting and nd that under some conditions suppliers
prefer to act independently as well.
To my best knowledge, the problem of exible production technologies in the context of verti-
cal relations has been not analyzed yet. Available literature on vertical relations and technology
focuses on supplier-buyer specic investments and the impact of vertical merger on such invest-
ments. This approach assumes that technology used by vertically separated rms inuences
input price, not product variety. For example, Kranton and Minehart (2004) use a framework
in which there are two upstream and two downstream rms. Downstream rms compete for
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one indivisible input unit produced by each supplier. Buyersvaluation of input depends on
their investments into supplier-specic assets. Focusing on vertical merger and its e¤ect on
downstream investment decisions into assets that are specic to supplier-buyer relations, they
nd that vertical merger might distort investments into technologies reducing production costs
of the remaining rms. Similarly, regarding e¢ ciency-increasing investments, Inderst and Wey
(2003) analyze the e¤ect of upstream and downstream market structure on suppliersinnovation
investments. They consider technological exibility in terms of production volume and tech-
nology choice that determines the level of production costs. Another work by Inderst and Wey
(2007) follows this line and analyzes the question of how the distribution of bargaining power in
value chain a¤ects suppliersincentives to make technological improvements and reduce marginal
production costs.
The model developed in this paper exhibits characteristics of successive monopolies and
foreclosure. Regarding the issue of successive monopolies, due to the type of relations between
upstream and downstream rms, we can observe a well-known problem of double marginaliza-
tion (Spengler (1950)). Although designing a remedy to this problem is beyond the scope of
this paper, it is worthwhile to mention that the use of exible production technologies intensies
competition in the input and consumer market and reduces the harmful e¤ect of double mar-
ginalization. Regarding the foreclosure concept, provided that there are cost or technological
barriers to procure inputs necessary to broaden a rms product line, exible technologies can
be seen as a device to bypass foreclosure. Consequently, this links the current paper to the
discussion of vertical foreclosure and incentives to invest (see for example Hart et al. (1990),
Baake et al. (2003) and Fumagalli et al. (2006)).1
The current model includes some elements of exclusive dealing and vertical integration as
well. These issues are analyzed, for example, by Bonanno and Vickers (1988). By using a two-
part tari¤ contract as a mechanism to set prices, they model two single-product manufacturers
that sell their products to independent retailers and analyze what are producersincentives to
vertically integrate or to sell their products through independent retailers. Similar approach can
be found, for example, in Rey and Tirole (1986) and Rey and Stiglitz (1988).
Other papers that are closely related to the current one include Lin (1990) and Ziss (1995).
1For a literature overview on vertical foreclosure see Rey and Tirole (2006).
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The former one models two retail chains and argues that upstream rms choose an exclusive
dealing set-up in order to relax intra-brand competition. In the context of the current model,
exible technologies might have pro-competitive e¤ects, as they remove the exclusive dealing
constraints, intensify inter-brand rivalry and introduce intra-brand competition. Ziss (1995)
explicitly includes the issue of vertical mergers at both levels. His main nding is that both
types of merger have anti-competitive e¤ects.
Despite drawing on some already analyzed concepts, the design of the current paper di¤ers
from previous contributions. First, using the framework of complementarity between technology,
strategy and organization, I formalize the idea of the adoption of exible vs. specialized pro-
duction equipment and link it to rmsstrategies regarding broadening product line and their
impact on competition at the upstream and downstream level. Second, I discuss the concept
of technology as a means to bypass foreclosure and its pro-competitive e¤ects. This casts some
new light on how technological progress removes barriers to competition and, consequently, in-
uences social welfare. Lastly, I analyze welfare implications of di¤erent technology states under
both competitive and monopolistic structure of the upstream industry.
Besides conrming existing ndings, the contributions of the paper are manyfold. First,
running counter to the intuition, the results reveal that an increased competition due to the
di¤usion of FPT might erode any benets of such technologies. Although the use of FPT might
be protable from a point of view of an individual rm, when all rms in the industry adopt such
technologies they collectively forsake prots. Consequently, as there is a coordination problem,
rms end up in a PrisonersDilemma situation. To a large extent, this conrms the results of
Röller and Tombak (1990). Considering the e¤ect of the structure of the upstream industry,
I show that under some conditions, i.e. when products are complements, manufacturers are
more likely to adopt FPT when there is a multi-product monopolistic supplier of both inputs,
as compared to a state with two independent suppliers. The reverse is true when products
are substitutes. Second, I show that the introduction of FPT by downstream producers has
two e¤ects on the payo¤ to the upstream industry. On the one hand, selling to both rms
increases intra-brand competition and reduces suppliersprots. On the other hand, suppliers
benet from the pro-competitive e¤ects of FPT on the nal market. It seems that the latter
e¤ect dominates the former one. Furthermore, regarding suppliers, unlike in Lin (1990), under
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the current setting suppliers prefer to supply both downstream rms to exclusive interaction
with only one of them. Third, the adoption of FPT is always benecial from the consumers
and suppliers point of view. The fact that new technologies have always positive e¤ect on
consumer surplus is di¤erent from the ndings of Röller and Tombak (1990) who concluded
that such investments by downstream rms generate benets to consumers only for su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated products. Furthermore, considering the structure of the upstream industry, I nd
that a supplier merger increases consumer surplus when products are complements. In total,
the di¤usion of FPT has a positive impact on total welfare, provided that products are not close
substitutes, and for some intermediate values of market size, companiesequilibrium decisions
lead to socially ine¢ ecient outcomes.
Empirical research conrms that information and communication technologies (ICT) enable
rms to expand product variety and to deal with a following raise in the complexity and sophis-
tication of technological and business processes (e.g. Bakos, et al. (1986), Jaikumar, (1986),
Holland et al. (1997)). For example, a combination of new computer-based exible machinery
with new work practices allowed a Johnson&Johnson factory to signicantly increase the variety
of products it could manufacture and reduce costs (Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)). Similar trends
can be observed in the electronics industry where the choice of products and their functionali-
ties have been dramatically increasing over the last decades (Petkova (2003)). Dell Computer
is a quintessential New Economy company known for its exibility, leanness, and a variety of
products cut to customersneeds. Because of massive investments in ICT, Dell extended the
reach and scope of its business at a relatively low cost (Kraemer, et al. (2001)). Sophisticated
technologies allowed it to automate business and production functions and to coordinate a net-
work of suppliers and business partners who carry out most of the tasks involved in developing,
building and distributing of personal computers.
The impact of new technologies on product variety is not limited to manufacturing industries
only. Studies of the nancial intermediation, airline, hotel and rental car industries report that
systems linking organizations in value chain, i.e. inter-organizational systems or IOS, allow an
agent to access quickly a wide range of products o¤ered by di¤erent providers and to bundle them
in order to create a combination cut to individual customer needs (Hess et al. (1994) or Johnston
et al. (1988)). In a study of the causes of Wal-Marts growth, Basker (2007) cites bar code and
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RFID as major sources of the retailers success. The availability of a technology that reduces
the inventory tracking costs and improves the overall e¢ ciency of the supply chain increases the
incentives to add product lines led directly to the creation of supercenters that sell a full line of
groceries in addition to general merchandise. The rapid and ubiquitous spread of ICT and exible
production systems have implications for suppliers of rms implementing them as well. Dewan
et al. (1998) analyzes the link between the scale and scope of a rm and its ICT investments
with an emphasis of the role of ICT in coordination with suppliers. The results suggest that
ICT investments are positively related to the degree of rm diversication. Similarly, Hempell
et al. (2005) study how ICT drives product and process innovations by enhancing organizational
exibility. They conclude that by facilitating communication and access to information, ICT
favours the use of easily programmable machines and improves the coordination with suppliers.
Moreover, ICT increases the organizational exibility as it allows for a quick reaction to changes
in consumer preferences. This additionally increases the incentives to expand the product line.
However, the process of strategy and organizational changes driven by the di¤usion of new
technologies has consequences that go far beyond the boundaries of rms that adopt them. For
example, as rms broadening product line remove the boundaries between separate markets,
suppliers of such rms are exposed to stronger competition. Furthermore, an increase in the
number of downstream rms demanding inputs might raise suppliers minimum e¢ cient size
of operations necessary to satisfy new demand. Thus, it can be expected that facing stronger
pressure to take over a number of responsibilities and deal with an increased demand for in-
termediary products, suppliers might need to either preempt of response to these challenges.
One way to deal with them is to increase the scale of operations or to reduce the intensity of
upstream competition. Both e¤ects can be achieved through a consolidation process. Indeed,
it has been observed that rms are going through intensive shake-outs and waves of mergers
during periods of especially high demand (Bernile, et al. (2007)). Consequently, if protable at
rst glance, the adoption of new production system might not bring the expected payo¤ once
preempted by other partners in the value chain.
The automotive industry provides an interesting example of the relationship between tech-
nology, product variety and vertical organization. The consolidation within the automotive
suppliers network is a response to constantly increasing quality demands, taking over more
7
operations in design and production, on the one hand, and to reduce price, on the other hand.
Consequently, manufacturers are becoming more dependent on suppliers and suppliers are be-
coming more involved into development and manufacture of a greater number of products. As
a result, the number of automotive suppliers worldwide is expected to shrink by half by 2015
(VDA (2004)). At the same time, new technologies deployed in product design, manufacturing
and interactions with suppliers allow car manufacturers to steadily increase the number of car
models (Dicken (2003)). In 2002 there were over 1000 car models o¤ered for sale in the United
States, double as much as in 1980 (van Biesebroeck (2006)). The answer to the question regard-
ing protability of such changes is more complex than it seems. For example, since early 90s,
the BMW product line has expanded from 5 to 10 lines (PWC, mimeo). At the same time, the
production volume reached over 1.3 million in 2005 from 0.5 million units in 1990. Although,
between 2001 and 2005, the revenues increased by over 30% to nearly 46 billion Euro, gross
margin has in fact declined from 8.3% to 6.5% in the same period. Thus, the changes in vertical
structure and the impacts of the di¤usion of FPT might go far beyond the increased product
variety o¤ered by rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 analyses outcomes that emerge in the current structure and Section 4 identies equilibria.
Section 5 considers welfare implications of both technology choice and the market structure
of the upstream industry. Section 6 concludes and suggests some potential extensions to the
current analysis. Appendix includes proofs.
2 The Model
I consider two supply chains in which downstream producers buy inputs from either one or two
suppliers. There are two products in the market, X and Y. In order to produce each product,
downstream rm needs technology that is specic to the input for a particular product. Figure
1 illustrates all possible technology states. If downstream producer P1 (P2) uses dedicated
technology (D) it can purchase input from upstream supplier U1 (U2) and supply nal good
X (Y). This is case (D,D). If downstream rm uses exible technology (F) they can be active
in both parts of the market (case (F,F)). Mixed outcomes, i.e. (F,D) and (D,F), in which
downstream rms can use di¤erent technologies are allowed. An identical situation is possible
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when there is only one supplier of both inputs (dashed circles).
The game has four stages:
 Stage one: Suppliers decide on whether to merge or stay independent.
 Stage two: Producers choose between dedicated and exible technology.
 Stage three: Suppliers set input prices. I assume that each supplier maximizes his prot
with respect to input price, given demand of downstream rms and the strategy of the
other supplier. If there is only one multi-product supplier, he maximizes its prot with
respect to both input prices.
 Stage four: Producers play a Cournot game on the consumer market.
In contrast to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), I assume that suppliers have all the bargaining
power and make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to manufacturers. Within this framework, it is very
likely that in equilibrium suppliers choose to merge over acting independently. The motivation
behind this assumption is the question of how technology choices of downstream rms di¤er
with respect to the market structure of the upstream industry.
Figure 1: Technology states
*Technology state 3: (D,F)
1. (D,D)
U1X
P1X P2Y
U2Y
YX
2. (F,D)*
U1X
P1XY P2Y
U2Y
YX
4. (F,F)
U1X
P1XY P2XY
U2Y
YX
In order to describe the market demand for product X and Y, I follow Matutes et al. (1989)
and assume some degree of product di¤erentiation. For each of the two goods consumers maxi-
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mize a utility function that is separable in the numeraire good M :
V [X;Y;M ] = U(X;Y ) +M (1)
where X and Y are the total quantities of both products. Let the quadratic utility function be
given by:
U = (X + Y )  1
2
(X2 + Y 2 + 2XY ); (2)
then the rst order conditions of the consumer maximization problem yield the following demand
functions:
pX =   Y  X and pY =   X   Y (3)
where pX and pY are the prices for product X and Y . X = x1 + x2 and Y = y1 + y2 are
the total quantities of product X and Y produced by downstream rm i = 1; 2. Parameter 
can be interpreted as a determinant of product di¤erentiation. Products are complements when
 1   < 0 and substitutes when 0 <   1. If  = 0, product are not related. These conditions
guarantee that the own price e¤ect is always stronger than the cross-price e¤ect. The vale of 
can be interpreted as the potential size of the market.
Regarding the cost structure, I assume that suppliers do not incur any costs and that the
cost of inputs is the only marginal cost of producers. Thus, given the above dened demand
system and cost structure, the payo¤ function of each downstream rm i = 1; 2 is:
Pki;j = (p
Xk
j   wXkj )xkij + (pY kj   wY kj )ykij   ft (4)
where P denotes downstream rm and k = I;M represents the structure of the upstream
industry where I denotes independent suppliers and M a multi-product monopolistic supplier.
Technology choice of downstream producers is denoted by j = 1; :::; 4 where j = 1 indicates that
both rms invest in dedicated technologies (D, D), j = 2 when rm 1 invests in technology F and
rm 2 in technology D, (F, D). In this case, rm 2 procures input only from supplier 2 and rm
1 from both of them. The reverse is true in j = 3 when rm 2 chooses technology F and rm
1 technology D, (D,F). The last case, j = 4, is when both rms invest in technology F, (F, F).
This means that both downstream rms can procure inputs for both products. Input prices for
product X and Y are given by wXk and wY k respectively. ft is the xed cost of the production
technology t = D;F that downstream rms need to incur. Let the cost of dedicated technology
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be fD = 1 and the cost of exible technology fF = 1 + s. To make it realistic, I assume that
technology F is more costly than technology D, i.e. s > 0. Both production technologies exhibit
constant returns to scale, i.e. out of one unit of input downstream rm produces one unit of
output. As tie-breaking rules, if downstream producer is indi¤erent between technologies it will
choose exible one.
The payo¤ function of independent upstream rms i = 1; 2 is given by:
U1;j = w
Xk
j X
k
j and 
U
2j = w
Y k
j Y
k
j (5)
where U denotes upstream rm. Supplier 1 produces input for nal product X and supplier 2
for nal product Y. A single supplier faces the following maximization problem
UM;j = w
Xk
j X
k
j + w
Y k
j Y
k
j (6)
where M denotes a multiproduct monopolistic supplier. Whenever suppliers are indi¤erent
between merging or remaining independent they will merge. Table 1 exhibits the payo¤s to
downstream and upstream rms in all possible settings.
Table 1: Technology choice and rmspayo¤s
Firm 2
D F
Firm 1 D (Pk11 ; 
Pk
21 ); (
U
11; 
U
21) or 
U
M1 (
Pk
13 ; 
Pk
23 ); (
U
13; 
U
23) or 
U
M1
F (Pk12 ; 
Pk
22 ); (
U
12; 
U
22) or 
U
M1 (
Pk
14 ; 
Pk
24 ); (
U
14; 
U
24) or 
U
M1
3 Input prices and product quantities
Except for the whole game, there are two sub-games. One with independent suppliers of each
intermediary product and one with a multi-product upstream monopoly. Depending on the
technology choice, there are four possible outcomes at the downstream level. By using backward
induction, in the following section I solve the game for the nal quantities and input prices that
arise in each technology state under both structures of the upstream industry. Then, I use these
results to nd a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the merger and technology game.
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3.1 Independent suppliers
Technology outcome (D,D): In the rst case, (D, D), both manufacturers use dedicated
technologies and supply only one product. Firm 1 produces good X and rm 2 produces good
Y. In this case, rm 1 interacts with supplier 1 and rm 2 with supplier 2. Both downstream
rms have symmetric prot functions of the form:
PI11 = (p
XI
1   wXI1 )xI11   1 and PI21 = (pY I1   wY I1 )yI21   1: (7)
Solving for Cournot equilibrium outcomes, yields symmetric quantities:
xI11 =
(   2)  wY I1 + 2wXI1
2   4 and y
I
21 =
(   2)  wXI1 + 2wY I1
2   4 : (8)
As one piece of input is used up to produce one piece of output, quantities produced by manu-
facturers are at the same time the demanded quantities for inputs. Thus, by maximizing their
prot functions with respect to wXI1 and w
Y I
1 , suppliers set symmetric prices for product X and
Y:
wXI1 = w
Y I
1 =
(   2)
   4 : (9)
Substituting input prices into the reaction functions of downstream rms leads to the following
expression:
xI11 = y
I
21 =
2
( + 2)(4  ) : (10)
Technology outcome (F,D) or (D,F): In the second and third case, asymmetric outcomes
arise, i.e. when one downstream rm uses dedicated and the other one exible technology. Let
us consider the (F,D) outcome when rm 1 uses technology F and rm 2 technology D. In this
case, manufacturer 1 is able to interact with supplier 1 and 2. As a result, it produces X and Y.
Manufacturer 2, in contrast, procures only from supplier 2 and produces product Y only. Thus,
the payo¤ functions of manufacturers are asymmetric, i.e.
PI12 = (p
XI
2   wXI2 )xI12 + (pY I2   wY I2 )yI12   (1 + s) (11)
and PI22 = (p
Y I
2   wY I2 )yI22   1: (12)
By maximizing the above expression with respect to xI12; y
I
12 and y
I
22, one obtains the following
reaction functions:
xI12 =
(   1)  wY I2 + wXI2
2(2   1) (13)
12
and yI12 =
(2   3 + 2)  2wY I2 + 3wXI2   2wY I2
6(1  2) ; y
I
22 =
  wY I2
3
: (14)
The above quantities enter the prot functions of upstream rms, which maximize them with
respect to input prices wXI2 and w
Y I
2 . As a result, asymmetric prices for X and Y arise:
wXI2 =
(3   52   4 + 8)
16  72 and w
Y I
2 =
(52 + 3   8)
72   16 : (15)
By substituting input prices into the reaction functions of downstream rms, one obtains the
following equilibrium quantities:
xI12 =
(2   4   8)
2( + 1)(72   16) ; (16)
and yI12 =
(3 + 102 + 2   16)
6( + 1)(72   16) ; y
I
22 =
(22   3   8)
3(72   16) : (17)
It is straightforward, that the demand for input Y is higher than for input X. Consequently,
supplier 2 earns a higher prot because it sells inputs to both downstream rms.
In the third case, (D, F), the reverse of the (F,D) state is true. That is, PI13 = 
PI
22 and
PI23 = 
PI
12 at the downstream level, and 
U
13 = 
U
22 and 
U
23 = 
U
12 at the upstream level.
Technology outcome (F,F): In the fourth technology case, (F, F), both manufacturers invest
in F technology and each of them procures both inputs and produces X and Y. Consequently,
manufacturers maximize symmetric prot functions with respect to xIi4 and y
I
i4:
PI14 = (p
XI
4   wXI4 )xI14 + (pY I4   wY I4 )yI14   (1 + s) (18)
and PI24 = (p
XI
4   wXI4 )xI24 + (pY I4   wY I4 )yI24   (1 + s): (19)
This gives symmetric quantities of xIi4 and y
I
i4 manufactured by downstream rms, i.e.:
xI14 = x
I
24 =
(   1)  wY I4 + wXI4
3(2   1) (20)
and yI14 = y
I
24 =
(   1)  wXI4 + wY I4
3(2   1) : (21)
In contrast to the (D,D) outcome, suppliers deliver their inputs to both downstream rms
and their prot functions can be expressed as
U14 = w
XI
4 (x
I
14 + x
I
24) (22)
and U24 = w
Y
4 (y
I
14 + y
I
24): (23)
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Again, this leads to symmetric input prices for X and Y:
wXI4 = w
Y I
4 =
(   1)
   2 (24)
and eventually symmetric quantities sold on the nal market are:
xI14 = x
I
24 = y
I
14 = y
I
24 =

3(2  )( + 1) : (25)
3.2 A monopolistic multiproduct supplier
Technology outcome (D,D): As in the case with independent suppliers, downstream rms
have symmetric prot functions (7) and, consequently, symmetric reaction functions (8). A
multiproduct single supplier sets both input prices at the highest possible level, i.e. wXM1 =
wYM1 =

2 : The resulting equilibrium quantities are
xM11 = y
M
21 =
2
2( + 2)
: (26)
Technology outcome (F,D) or (D,F): Again, in the asymmetric case, a monopolistic sup-
plier takes the demand of manufacturers given by (13) and (14) and maximizes its prot by
setting monopolistic prices for both inputs. Thus, substituting input prices into the reaction
functions of downstream rms leads to the following expression:
xM12 =

4( + 1)
; (27)
and yM12 =
(2  )
12( + 1)
; yM22 =

6
: (28)
In the (D, F) case, the reverse of the second state is true, i.e. xM13 = yM22 ; xM23 = yM12 ; yM23 =
xM12 ; PM13 = PM22 and PM23 = PM12 at the downstream level, and UM3 = 
U
M2 at the upstream
level.
Technology outcome (F,F): Similarly as above, the monopolistic supplier maximizes its
total prot by setting monopolistic input prices for both products. The nal outcome of the
Cournot competition by downstream rms can be expressed as
xM14 = x
M
24 = y
M
14 = y
M
24 =

6( + 1)
: (29)
Table 1A and 2A (Appendix) present equilibrium expressions for all possible technology
states when suppliers stay independent or when they merge.
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4 Equilibrium analysis
By comparing equilibrium prots in each market structure and technology outcome, I look for a
sub-game perfect equilibrium. In addition, this section discusses the impact of technology cost,
market size and the degree of product di¤erentiation on the choice of upstream market structure
and the adoption of production technology.
4.1 Independent suppliers
This section deals with the sub-game with a competitive structure of the upstream industry.
After suppliers chose to stay independent in the rst stage, producers choose between FPT and
DPT in the second stage. Subsequently, each supplier maximizes its prot with respect to input
price, given quantities ordered by downstream rms and the strategy of the other supplier. In
the last stage, downstream producers compete in a Cournot game.
Independent suppliers and (D, D) equilibrium: The state with two independent suppliers
and downstream rms choosing dedicated technologies is an equilibrium when two conditions
are satised. First, from table 1 we see that both downstream rms choose D technology when
PI12   PI11 < 0 and PI23   PI21 < 0: (30)
This can be expressed as:
f IDD() 
s
2
< 0 (31)
where
f IDD() =
(7 + 36   685 + 84   1763   8322   1152   1024)
36( + 1)(   4)2( + 2)2(72   16) (32)
Second, for the equilibrium to exist, prots of independent suppliers must be higher than this
of a monopolistic supplier. This is true when
U11 + 
U
21 > 
U
M1: (33)
This condition is satised if
a22
2( + 2)(   4)2 < 0: (34)
Regarding the choice of technology, expression (31) suggests that both buyers remain using D
technologies when  is small and s is high. In other words, small market size discourages rms
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from entering the part of the market dominated by the other rm. Each rm prefers to stay a
one-product monopolist rather than to get involved into direct competition with the other rm.
Large values of s additionally discourage rms investments into exible production systems.
Turning to the second condition (34), it is known from Salant (1983) that merger to monopoly
is always protable. This result holds when all the rms collude, so that there are no outsiders.
In this case, there are only two rms and it can be seen that whenever products X and Y are
complements or substitutes, i.e.  2 [ 1; 1], (34) is always positive and suppliers choose to
merge.
Independent suppliers and (F, F) equilibrium: The state with two independent suppliers
and both downstream rms choosing exible technology is an equilibrium when two conditions
are satised. First, from table 1 we see that both downstream rms choose F technology when
PI14  PI12 and PI24  PI23 : (35)
This condition is satised if
f IFF () 
s
2
 0 (36)
where
f IFF () =
(256  192   1642 + 1283   354   135 + 246   47)
9( + 1)(   2)2(72   16)2 : (37)
Second, prots of independent suppliers must be higher than a monopolists payo¤. This is true
when
U14 + 
U
24 > 
U
M4 (38)
which can be expressed as:
22
3(   2)2( + 1) < 0: (39)
In line with the above case, both producers will switch to technology F when  is large. In
other words, large market size gives rms a strong incentive to produce both products and to
get involved into direct competition with the other rm. The revenue generated from the sales
of the additional product compensate the losses from more intense competition and lower prices.
Of course, high technology cots reduces the gains from an increased product variety.
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Regarding the upstream market structure, as in the previous case condition (39) is fullled
for all values of . Thus, suppliers always choose to merge, given that they are price setters in
the input market.
Independent suppliers and mixed equilibria: In (F, D) or (D, F) equilibrium, producer 1
uses technology F and producer 2 technology D or the other way around. Such mixed equilibria
exist when two conditions are satised. First, from table 1 we know that (F, D) or (D, F) is an
equilibrium when
PI12   PI11  0 and PI24   PI22 < 0 (40)
and
PI14   PI13 < 0 and PI23   PI21  0: (41)
This can be expressed as:
f IDD() 
s
2
 0 (42)
and
f IFF () 
s
2
< 0: (43)
Second, prots of independent suppliers must be higher than this of a monopolistic supplier.
This is true when
U12 + 
U
22 > 
U
M2 and 
U
13 + 
U
23 > 
U
M3: (44)
This condition is satised if
22(112 + 112 + 52   133)
8( + 1)(72   16)2 < 0: (45)
Regarding the technology choice of downstream companies, these sub-game equilibria would
result in the region between condition (31) and (36). However, because the pay-o¤ to the multi-
product monopolistic supplier is always higher than to the independent suppliers and upstream
rms choose to merge. Consequently, expression (45) is positive for all values of  and  and
there is no equilibrium with a competitive structure of the upstream industry. In conclusion,
the analysis of the above equilibrium conditions can be summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: For all values of ;  and s, suppliers choose to merge and there is no equilibrium
with a competitive upstream market structure.
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Proof: The proof emerges from the suppliers prot conditions, i.e. condition (34), (39)
and (45) are never satised. In other words, the prot of a multiproduct monopolistic supplier
is never smaller than the cumulative prot of independent suppliers. The same result can be
found in Salant (1983). Consequently, there is no outcome with a competitive upstream market
structure in the equilibrium.
4.2 A single supplier
This section analyses candidate equilibria that emerge given the upstream industry was mo-
nopolized in the rst stage of the game. Proceeding as above, the game is solved by backward
induction. After suppliers decided to merge in the rst stage, downstream rms choose produc-
tion technology in the second stage. Subsequently, a monopolist supplier maximizes its prot
function with respect to input prices given quantities ordered by downstream rms. In the last
stage manufacturers set the quantities of the nal goods in a Cournot game.
A single supplier and (D, D) equilibrium The state with one supplier and downstream
rms choosing dedicated technology is an equilibrium when two conditions are satised. First,
both downstream rms choose D technology when the following condition holds:
fMDD() 
s
2
< 0 (46)
where
fMDD() =
(16  4   72   53)
144( + 1)( + 2)2
: (47)
Second, suppliers merge if the monopolistic prot is higher than the prots of the two sellers.
This condition is fullled if
22
2( + 2)(   4)2  0: (48)
From the above analysis we know that condition (46) depends on the degree of product di¤er-
entiation, market size and the cost of F technology. The smaller the market and the higher the
cost of F technology relatively to D technology, the more are downstream rms inclined to stay
with D technology. Regarding the upstream rms, prot of a single supplier is always higher
than the prots of separate rms and, consequently, suppliers choose to merge.
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A single supplier and (F, F) equilibrium The state with one supplier and both down-
stream rms choosing F technology is an equilibrium when two conditions are satised. First,
downstream rms choose F technology when
fMFF () 
s
2
 0 (49)
where
fMFF () =
(1  )
36( + 1)
: (50)
Second, prot of a monopolistic supplier is higher than prots of independent suppliers when
22
3(   2)2( + 1)  0: (51)
Considering condition (49), the choice of F technology is again dependent on the market size,
the degree of product di¤erentiation, and the cost of exible technology. However, although a
larger market size encourages both rm to switch to exible technology and to produce both
products, the incentive to expand is reduced by the cost of the new technology. The e¤ect of
 is equally important for the technology choice. It is easy to see that the expansion strongly
depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation. Regarding the merger incentive, we know that
(51) is positive for all values of .
A single supplier and mixed equilibria: The state with one supplier and downstream
rms choosing di¤erent technologies is an equilibrium when two conditions are satised. First,
from table 1 we see that (F, D) or (D, F) are selected when
fMDD() 
s
2
 0 (52)
and
fMFF () 
s
2
< 0: (53)
Second, the prot of a monopolistic supplier is higher than the prots of independent suppliers
when
22(112 + 112 + 52   133)
8( + 1)(72   16)2  0: (54)
Considering that (54) is positive for all  and, consequently, that suppliers always merge, mixed
equilibria would result in the region between condition (53) and (54). Both conditions are
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satised when rms sell complementary products. Thus, unlike in Röller and Tombak (1990)2,
for some values of  and , mixed equilibria can emerge.
The analysis of the above equilibrium conditions can be summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Suppliers always choose to merge. The technology choice of downstream rms
depends on ;  and s.
Proof: In the previous sub-section, I proved that conditions (34), (39) and (45) are never
satised and, therefore, suppliers always prefer to merge to act independently. Regarding the
choice of technology by downstream rms, it can be seen from condition (46) and (49) that
the incentives to choose particular technology vary with ;  and s. Concluding, Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, suppliers choose to merge. The technology choice of downstream
rms depends on the size of the market, the degree of product di¤erentiation and the technology
cost in the following way:
 (D,D) is an equilibrium if  <
q
s
fMDD()
,
 (F,F) is an equilibrium if  
q
s
fMFF ()
,
 and (F,D) or (D,F) arise in equilibrium when
q
s
fMDD()
  <
q
s
fMFF ()
.
Figure 2 illustrates equilibrium regions for all technology choices in  and  for a value of
s = 0:5.3 For illustrative purposes, I include equilibrium outcomes that would emerge under
the competitive structure of the upstream industry. Let us consider rst the sub-game with two
independent suppliers. The region below the (D,D)i curve includes the technology state in which
both downstream rms remain with dedicated technology. The surface above the (F,F)i curve
shows the technology state in which both rms switch to exible technology. The area between
(D,D)i and (F,F)i includes mixed technology choices. It can be seen that, if there were two
suppliers, all possible combinations of technology usage patterns could emerge. For example,
2See Kim et al. (1992) and Gupta (1993), that in the corrected Röller and Tombak (1990) model mixed
equilibria cannot emerge.
3To check the robustness of the results, the gure was plotted for various parameters of s. The results are not
sensitive to the changes of parameter values.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regions given independent (i) and monopolistic (m) supplier (s=0.5)
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when products X and Y are complements mixed outcomes would exist for  2 [ 1; 0:41].
That is, one rm would invest into FPT whereas the other one would remain with specialized
equipment. Similarly, mixed outcomes could emerge for substitutable products. Then, both
companies would invest into exible production technologies only when market was su¢ ciently
large. Otherwise either one or both rms would remain with specialized equipment. For  2
[ 0:41; 0] both equilibria could exist, i.e. (D,D) and (F,F).
Investment decision look slightly di¤erently when there is a multi-product monopolistic sup-
plier. Similar as above, the region below the (D,D)m curve includes the technology state in
which both downstream rms remain with dedicated technology. The surface above the (F,F)m
curve shows the technology state in which both rms use exible technology. The area be-
tween (D,D)m and (F,F)m includes mixed technology outcomes. Again, we can observe that all
technology choices can emerge in equilibrium. For example, mixed equilibria exist only when
products are complements. For substitutable products only (F,F) or (D,D) emerge in equilib-
rium. Furthermore, for  2 [0; 1] two equilibria exist and companies face a coordination problem
for some values of .
As it emerges from the above analysis, it is quite striking how the degree of product di¤er-
entiation inuences the decision to adopt exible technologies under di¤erent structures of the
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upstream industry. Compared to a situation when there are two independent suppliers, when
manufacturers produce complementary products they are more likely to adopt F technology in
small markets under monopolistic upstream market structure. This is, however, reversed when
products are substitutes. Then FPT would be adopted in much smaller markets if supplier acted
independently.
In conclusion, taking into account all possible outcomes, in equilibrium there is a monopolistic
supplier of both products. The nal outcome regarding the choice of production is less obvious
and depends on the values of ,  and s, i.e. it is a function of market size, the degree of product
di¤erentiation and the cost di¤erence between dedicated and exible production technology.
5 Welfare implications
5.1 Consumer surplus
Considering that there are linear demand functions for product X and Y, consumer surplus is
given by the di¤erence between consumersutility and the total expenses for purchased goods.
Thus, the combined consumer surplus for a given technology state j is given by:
CSkj =
1
2
((Xkj )
2 + (Y kj )
2) + Xkj Y
k
j (55)
where Xkj and Y
k
j are the equilibrium total quantities of product X and Y under upstream
market structure k = I;M and technology state j. Equilibrium values of consumer surplus are
given in Table 2.
Table 2: Consumer surplus
Independent suppliers
(D,D) 4(+1)
( 4)2(+2)2
Mixed equilibrium 
2(555 474 6323 1762+1792+1600)
72(+1)(72 16)2
(F,F) 4
2
9(+1)( 2)2
A single supplier
(D,D) 
2(+1)
4(+2)2
Mixed equilibrium 
2(7+25)
288(+1)
(F,F) 
2
9(+1)
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An analysis of the consumer surplus equilibrium values leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 3: If CSkj is the total consumer surplus in technology state j under upstream
market structure k, then:
a) CSI4  CSI2 = CSI3  CSI1 ;
b) CSM4  CSM2 = CSM3  CSM1 ;
c) CSI4  CSM4 if  2 [0; 1];
d) CSI4  CSM4 if  2 [ 1; 0].
Proof. See appendix.
Results (a) and (b) imply that consumer surplus is always maximized when downstream
rms extend their product range. In other words, consumers benet from an increased com-
petition that results from rmsdecisions to serve both parts of the market. If there were two
independent input suppliers, the introduction of exible production systems would introduce
intra-brand competition and intensify inter-brand rivalry as well. When the upstream industry
is monopolized the main trigger of consumer welfare increase is the intensied competition in
the nal product market. Consequently, the structure of the upstream industry does not have
any e¤ect on consumer surplus when only the technology states are considered. It should be
noted that this is true for all types of products.
Although intuitively straightforward, this nding is slightly di¤erent from the result in Röller
et al. (1990) and Gupta (1998).4 They show that consumer surplus is maximized in (F,F) tech-
nology state only for 0 <   0:80. In other words, the use of FPT decreases consumer surplus
when product X and Y are close substitutes. Under the current setting, however, consumer
surplus is the highest when both producers use FPT over the entire range of . Consequently,
I show that it is always desirable to adopt FPT from the consumerspoint of view. This is due
to the fact that this type of technologies enable rms to cross the boundaries of the originally
separated parts of the market, which in turn leads to more competition among rm that were
previously isolated from each other and thereby lower prices. This result holds even when the
upstream industry is monopolized as well.
4See Gupta (1993) that (F, F) equilibrium is the most optimal from consumerspoint of view, except when
products are strong substitutes.
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This nding is di¤erent from the conclusion made by Norman and Thisse (1999). According
to them, consumers might not benet from tougher competition. Within the current setting,
however, one can conclude that consumers always get the benet of an increased competition
between manufacturers. The source of this discrepancy is the di¤erence in model setting and
in the scope of analysis. In particular, they analyze the impact of the introduction of exible
technologies on entry, an issue not covered here, and nd that this type of manufacturing deters
entry. This, in turn, reduces the pro-competitive e¤ect of exibility.
In conclusion, the results regarding the use of technology can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The use of FPT always maximizes consumer surplus.
Proof: The proof of this proposition follows directly from the results described above and
summarized in Lemma 3.
Considering the e¤ect of the upstream industry structure on consumer surplus, the above
discussion suggests that consumer surplus should be maximized under competitive conditions.
However, this depends on the type of products. Results (c) and (d) imply that, on the one
hand, when products are substitutes, a competitive market structure of the input market would
lead to the maximization of the consumer surplus. On the other hand, however, when products
are complements consumer surplus is maximized when there is a single supplier of both inputs.
This indicates that upstream merger might be desirable from the consumerspoint of view when
products are complements. The source of this positive e¤ect of the monopolization of the input
industry is that, when products are complements, monopolistic input price is always lower than
the price set by independent suppliers. To see this, one needs to consider the di¤erence between
input prices under both upstream market structures. For the (D,D) technology state and for the
(F,F) technology state the following conditions are always fullled for complementary products:
wXI1   2  0, 2( 4)  0 and wXI4   2  0, 2( 2)  0. In a mixed case, this e¤ect exists
only for the input for which there is a demand from two suppliers, i.e. in the (F,D) technology
state wXI2   2  0, (32+8+3
2 23
2(72 16)  0 and, as above, wY I2   2  0, 3(2+)2(72 16)  0.
24
5.2 Producer surplus
Although it might be intuitively justied for downstream rms to extend their product range,
the protability of such a move needs to be veried in light of adverse impacts they might have
on the competition in the nal product market and in the input market. Thus, the following sec-
tion analyses the payo¤s to the upstream and downstream industries in di¤erent equilibria and,
in addition, compares them with the outcomes under a competitive structure of the upstream
industry. I rst look at the payo¤s of upstream rms and then turn to the surplus of down-
stream companies. The total prots of the upstream and downstream industry are presented in
Appendix (see Table 1A and Table 2A).
5.2.1 Upstream rms
The introduction of FPT by downstream rms should increase the demand for intermediary
products. However, when downstream rm switches from a dedicated to a exible technology it
begins to procure both inputs and, as a result, imposes some externality on its original supplier.
The type of this externality depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation. For example, let us
consider a situation in which only producer 1 adopts exible technology and producer 2 remains
with dedicated production system. On the one hand, when products are complements higher
demand for input Y should increase the demand for input X. Thus, the decision of producer 1
to enter the other part of the market creates positive externality for supplier 1. On the other
hand, however, when products are substitutes, the demand for input Y increases at the expense
of input X. This, in turn, imposes negative externality on supplier 1 which increases in . To
see this, it is enough to show that
USI4   USI2  0 and USI4   USI3  0 (56)
and
USI4   USI1  0 (57)
where USkj represents total payo¤s of suppliers given technology state j and sub-game equilib-
rium k = I;M where I stands for independent suppliers and M for a single supplier. Condition
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(56) is given by
2(128  256   402 + 1923   104   65 + 36   117)
3(   2)2(1 + )(16  72)2  0 (58)
and condition (57) can be expressed as
82(4   43 + 62   10 + 4)
3( + 1)( + 2)(   4)2(   2)2  0: (59)
The e¤ect of the degree of product di¤erentiation on the payo¤s of upstream rms can be
expressed graphically. Figure 4 depicts suppliers total surplus in all technology states as a
function of . The surplus of upstream rms is at rst the highest in (F,F) technology state
and decreases in . When products become close substitutes, however, the negative externality
posed by downstream rms increases the rivalry in the input market to such extent, that the
payo¤ in (F,F) state becomes smaller than in (D,D) state. Consequently, (58) and (59) hold
only for some values of . In this particular case, i.e. when  = 10, (58) holds for  2 [ 1; 0:6]
and (59) is true for  2 [ 1; 0:51]. Then, the surplus of upstream rms is maximized when
both downstream rms use D technology. In other words, suppliers prefer to maintain exclusive
relations with producers.
Figure 3: Supplierssurplus (independent suppliers, =10)
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Figure 4:
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Let us now consider the case when there is one multi-product supplier. From the previ-
ous analysis we know that the monopolistic supplier is always able to set prices that maximize
monopolists prot in all technology cases, i.e. wXMj = w
YM
j =

2 . The possibility to set monop-
olistic prices for both inputs o¤sets the negative e¤ects of increased intra-brand competition.
Consequently, by selling both inputs to both downstream rms, a single supplier always benets
from a higher demand stimulated by the use of FPT. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The prot of a multi-product monopolistic supplier is the highest when both
manufacturers use FPT.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 5: Supplierssurplus (a single supplier, =10)
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Because the choice of technology made by downstream rms determines the nal quantities
of both products and, as a result, the demand for intermediate inputs, it has also an impact on
the sellers nal payo¤. The total payo¤ of the upstream industry is however less sensitive to the
degree of product di¤erentiation and the technology choice when there is only a monopolistic
supplier of both inputs, compared to the structure with two independent suppliers. Again,
this can be illustrated graphically. Figure 5 shows that, although product substitutability is
negatively related to the total payo¤, a multi-product monopoly always maximizes its prot
when each manufacturer is active in both parts of the market.
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The above ndings di¤ers from the result obtained by Lin (1990). According to him, up-
stream rms prefer to choose exclusive dealing relations with downstream rms, which allow
them to earn greater prots. In the current setting, however, provided that products are either
complements or moderate substitutes, independent suppliers would benet from downstream
competition that has a direct impact on the quantities ordered by downstream rms. The total
payo¤ of a monopolistic multiproduct supplier is always maximized when both manufacturers
serve the two parts of the market.
5.2.2 Downstream rms
Intuitively, downstream companies forsake some prots when they are active in only one part of
the market. By using D technology, each rm excludes itself from the other part of the market
and reduces its nal payo¤. However, according to Röller et al. (1990), when both rms invest
into exible production technologies they reduce their prots due to increased rivalry in both
parts of the market. Only one rm can benet from producing both goods provided that the
other rm supplies only one part of the market. Consequently, because producers collectively
forsake prots when both of them adopt F technology, the technology choice takes a form of
a PrisonersDilemma. Thus, the answer to the question of what technology downstream rm
should choose to maximize its payo¤ might not be straightforward. Therefore, proceeding as
before, in the following section I analyze the payo¤s to the downstream manufacturers in all
technology states and under both structures of the upstream industry. The main question here
is which technology maximizes producersprots.
First, I would like to discuss this question under the assumption that upstream industry has
a competitive structure. Downstream rms might be inclined to adopt FPT in order to increase
the product range. This, however, might have adverse impact on their nal payo¤s. Similarly
as in the case of the input market, the competition and prots in the nal product market
will be inuenced by the type of dependency between both products. To see this, let us turn
to a graphical representation of producersprots in all technology states. Figure 6 illustrates
producerspayo¤s for  = 10 and s = 0:5. It can be seen that producerspayo¤ is maximized
in (F,F) technology state for a very limited range of . For most of the values of  producers
are better o¤ when they remain with specialized equipment or when only one of them invests in
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Figure 6: Producerssurplus (independent suppliers, =10, s=0.5)
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FPT. Thus, an analysis of the manufacturerssurplus leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 4: If PSIj = 
PI
1;j + 
PI
2;j is the total prot of the downstream industry in technology
state j, given a competitive structure of the upstream industry I, and when  = 10 and s = 0:5
then:
a) PSI1  PSI2 = PSI3 if  2 [ 0:65; 0:24];
b) PSI1  PSI4 if  2 [ 0:75; 0:32];
c) PSI4  PSI2 = PSI3 if  2 [0:54; 0:95];
Proof. See appendix.
Consequently, as it emerges from the above discussion, it is not always optimal from pro-
ducersstand point when both rms invest in exible technologies.
Proceeding as above, let us now turn to the equilibrium outcomes that emerge under a
monopolized upstream industry. Figure 7 illustrates the surplus of downstream rms for  = 10
and s = 0:5. It can be seen that the negative e¤ect of FPT on producersprots is even stronger
when inputs are procured from a multi-product monopolist. Nearly over the entire range of
 downstream rms maximize the total industry prot when they remain active in separated
markets. An analysis of producerspayo¤s leads to the following the following lemma:
Lemma 5: If PSMj = 
PM
1;j +
PM
2;j is the total prot of the downstream industry in technology
state j, given a monopolistic structure of the upstream industry M , and when  = 10 and s = 0:5
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then:
a) PSM1  PSM2 = PSM3 if  2 [ 0:39; 1];
b) PSM1  PSM4 if  2 [ 0:55; 1];
c) PSM4  PSM2 = PSM3 if  2 [ 1; 1].
Proof: See appendix.
Lemma 5 implies that the payo¤s of downstream rms decrease in  and as the level of
product complementarity decreases or products become stronger substitutes, companies forsake
prots when they use FPT. This counters the intuition that rms can increase their payo¤s by
diversication. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium outcomes, the cumulative prot of downstream rms depends on
the market size and the degree of product di¤erentiation. The use of FPT by both producers
never maximizes the total payo¤ of the downstream industry.
Proof of the above proposition follows from the proof of Lemma 5 (see Appendix).
Figure 7: Producerssurplus (a single supplier, =10, s=0.5)
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To a large extent these results are consistent with those by Röller et al. (1990). In particular,
they conrm that, in most of the cases, an extension of the product range is detrimental to the
producerstotal payo¤. Although the ability to produce many products leads to a signicant
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increase in the prots of the producer switching from DPT to FPT, it happens at the expense
of the other producer. Once both producers adopt FPT, the result is an immediate increase of
intra-brand competition and the introduction of inter-brand rivalry. Eventually, both rms are
worse o¤ when they parallel choose exible production technology. Obviously, this leads to a
PrisonersDilemma.
5.3 Total welfare
This section discusses the e¤ects of technology choice by downstream rms and consolidation
of the upstream industry on total welfare. As usual, total welfare includes consumer surplus
and total prots of both industries. Table 3 gives expressions for total welfare in all technology
states and under both structures of the upstream industry.
Table 3: Total welfare
Independent suppliers
(D,D) 4
2(+1)
( 4)2(+2)2   2
Mixed equilibrium 
2(3655 9714 30163 66402+4352+9152)
72(+1)(72 16)2   2  s
(F,F) 4
2(5 3)
9(+1)( 2)2   2(s+ 1)
A single supplier
(D,D) 
2(3+7)
4(+2)2
  2
Mixed equilibrium 
2(17+143)
288(+1)   2  s
(F,F) 5
2
9(+1)   2(s+ 1)
Let us rst consider the e¤ect of technology choice by producers when there are two indepen-
dent suppliers. Intuitively, FPT has a competition-increasing e¤ect. Consequently, total welfare
should be maximized when downstream rms choose F technology and supply both products.
Then, from the social point of view, total welfare should be increased as the supply in the nal
market rises and prices decrease. To see this, let us turn to a graphical illustration. Figure 8
shows that the use of F technology by both rms is socially desirable indeed, but only to some
extent. Surprisingly, the presence of both rms in both parts of the market is desirable from the
social welfare perspective only if   0:95. When products are strong substitutes, asymmetric
solution, in which one rm uses D technology and the other F technology, is preferred. In other
words, if products are strong substitutes investing in FPT by both rms might be socially not
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e¢ cient. This coincides with the previous conclusion regarding the possible technology outcomes
under a competitive market structure. As illustrated in Figure 2, mixed equilibria could emerge
if there were two independent suppliers in the region of  close to 1. Thus, theoretically, there
would be no concern of overinvestment in FPT. However, in such a case, downstream rms
face a PrisonersDilemma, because, when both rms invest into exible production technologies
they reduce their prots due to increased rivalry in both parts of the market. Only one rm can
benet from producing both goods provided that the other rm supplies only one part of the
market.
Figure 8: Total surplus (independent suppliers, =10, s=0.5)
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Let us now turn to a sub-game with a multi-product monopolistic supplier. As illustrated
in gure (9), the negative e¤ect of FPT on producers payo¤ is even stronger when there is
a monopolistic supplier of both inputs. Consequently, this indicates that when products are
substitutable, investment into FPT might not be desired from the social welfare standpoint.
The benets of increased competition between closely substitutable products do not justify
large investments into new production technologies. This result holds for both types of the
upstream industry structure. Consequently, the following can be stated:
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Proposition 5 When nal products are su¢ ciently and =10, s=0.5, the investment in FPT
by both companies maximizes total welfare.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 9: Total surplus (a single supplier, =10, s=0.5)
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5.4 Total welfare and equilibrium technology choice
Taking stock of the implications of the technology choice and the structure of the upstream
industry on the total surplus, it is worthwhile to ask to what extent equilibrium technology
choice of downstream rms overlap with what is optimal from the total welfare point of view.
Figure (10) illustrates all technology equilibria that emerge in a sub-game with merged suppliers
together with the socially optimal outcomes in  and  for a value of s = 0:5.5 Regarding the
equilibrium technology choice, the region below the red (D,D)m curve includes the technology
state in which both downstream rms remain with dedicated technology. The surface above the
blue (F,F)m curve shows the technology state in which both rms switch to exible technology.
The area between (D,D)m and (F,F)m includes mixed technology choices.
5To check the robustness of the results, the gure was plotted for various parameters of s. The results are not
sensitive to the changes of parameter values.
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Regarding the socially optimal outcomes, the following curves illustrate the di¤erences be-
tween the total welfare values under various technology states. In particular, the green line
indicates the borderline for the condition that total welfare in a mixed outcome is greater than
total welfare in (D,D) state, i.e. Wmmixed  Wm1  0. Similarly, the violet and orange lines show
for what values of  and  total welfare in (F,F) state is greater than in the (D,D) and the
mixed state respectively, i.e. Wm4  Wm1  0 and Wm4  WmMixed  0.
Figure 10: Total surplus and technology equilibria (a single supplier, s=0.5)
An analysis of the equilibrium and the socially optimal welfare regions leads to the conclusion
that, for some range of , the choice of manufacturers does not lead to a socially e¢ cient outcome.
In general, producers invest in exible production technologies only when market is su¢ ciently
large. For example, when products are complements, the socially optimal move from the (D,D)
state to the mixed state lies above the green curve. In contrast, manufacturers choose the mixed
equilibrium for the region of  and  that lies between the red and blue curves. Similarly, the
equilibrium move from a mixed case to the (F,F) outcome lies above the blue curve, although
the socially optimal choice of FPT by both manufacturers would be for much smaller value of
, i.e. above the orange curve. A similar situation emerges when products are substitutes.6 It
6When there is a single multiproduct supplier of both inputs, mixed technology euilibria do not exist when
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can be seen that rms invest into FPT for much larger values of  (above the blue line) than
socially optimal (above the violet curve). In short, the socially ine¢ cient outcomes emerge for
values of  that lie:
 between the green and red lines when products are complements, and
 between the violet and blue lines for all types of products.
An additional analysis of the manufacturerschoice and the socially optimal outcome under a
competitive structure of the upstream industry revealed that the type of the upstream industry
structure does not move producers to an outcome, which would be desirable from the total
welfare point of view. Consequently, for some intermediate size of market there is a divergence
between the manufacturersincentives and socially optimal outcome. The above results can be
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 There is a set of  for which the manufacturers choice does not lead to a
socially e¢ cient outcome with respect to the technology choice. In general, manufacturers choose
to invest in FPT in much larger markets than it would be desirable from the social point of view.
Proof. See appendix.
6 Conclusions
The starting point of the discussion presented in this paper was the argument of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) that the adoption of FPT accompanied by complementary changes in rms
strategy and organization change modern manufacturing and service industries. The current
work aimed at illustrating these transformations and analyzing manufacturersdecisions regard-
ing the choice of production technologies in the context of vertical relations. By using a model
of two supply chains, I show that the e¤ects of the adoption of exible production equipment on
rmsprots and welfare is far from straightforward. First, although protable for an individ-
ual producer, the adoption of technologies increasing product variety across the entire industry
products are substitutes (see Section 4). There are only (D,D) or (F,F) technology equilibria or, for some , both
outcomes coexist.
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erodes producerspayo¤s. Although in some cases a mixed technology state in which one rm
uses exible and the other dedicated technology can be justied, downstream rms are better
o¤ when they remain with specialized equipment and produce only one product. In particular,
when products are close substitutes, any benets stemming from an increased product variety
do not justify investments into exible technology by all rms in the industry. As a result, pro-
ducers end up in a PrisonnersDilemma. Second, the introduction of exible technologies on the
payo¤ of the upstream industry is not straightforward as well. Contrary to some previous nd-
ings, I show that, regardless of the upstream market structure, the upstream industry is always
better o¤ when both downstream rms use FPT. In particular, a multiproduct monopolistic
suppliers benets from an increased demand for both inputs. However, these benets diminish
as products become close substitutes. Third, regarding the structure of the upstream industry,
suppliers maximize their prots when they merge in all cases, i.e. irrespective of the degree of
product di¤erentiation. Consequently, along consumers, a multiproduct monopolistic supplier
always benets from manufacturersmove towards new technologies and greater product variety.
Finally, the decisions made by producers with repsct to the technology choice are not always
e¢ cient from the social welfare point of view. In particular, rms invest into new technologies
only when markets are su¢ ciently large.
One of the limitations of the current work is that the design of the model inuences the
results. Consequently, it might be worthwhile to check their robustness under di¤erent frame-
works. One way to extend the current structure would be an introduction of a bargaining game
between upstream and downstream rms over two-part contracts, instead of a price maximiza-
tion and Cournot competition. Another way is to relax the assumption with respect to the
number of rms. Nevertheless, despite its simple framework, the model can be applied to a
number of realistic situations. Furthermore, the results obtained here seem to reex anecdo-
tal and empirical evidence on the technology-driven impacts on vertical relations and rms
strategies regarding product variety as well.
Concluding, the impacts of value chain transformation and the di¤usion of FPT might go far
beyond the increased product variety o¤ered by rms. Other changes that can be triggered by
the technological transition might include intensied competition in product and input markets.
Eventually, the changes might have adverse e¤ect on rms that seek to escape competition and
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increase protability by the adoption of new technologies.
7 Appendix
Table 1A: Equilibrium expressions for all technology states (independent suppliers)
Upstream (D,D) Mixed equilibrium (e.g. (F,D))7 (F,F)
wXIj
( 2)
( 4)
(3 52 4 8)
16 72
( 1)
( 2)
wY Ij
( 2)
( 4)
(52+3 8)
72 16
( 1)
( 2)
U1;j
22(2 )
(+2)( 4)2
 (5 94+83+642 64)
2(+1)(72 16)2
22(1 )
3( 2)2(+1)
U2;j
22(2 )
(+2)( 4)2
(255+654 1163 2842+64+256)
6(+1)(72 16)2
22(1 )
3( 2)2(+1)
Downstream
xI1;j ; x
I
2;j
2
(+2)(4 ) ; 0
(2 4 8)
2(+1)(72 16) ; 0

3(2 )(+1) ;

3(2 )(+1)
yI1;j ; y
I
2;j 0;
2
(+2)(4 )
(3+102+2 16)
6(+1)(72 16) ;
(22 3 8)
3(72 16)

3(2 )(+1) ;

3(2 )(+1)
pXIj
(2 6)
( 4)(+2)
(53 392 20+72)
6(16 72)
(3 4)
3( 2)
pY Ij
(2 6)
( 4)(+2)
(172+6 32)
3(72 16)
(3 4)
3( 2)
PI1;j
42
(+2)2( 4)2   1 
2(3+72 28 52)
36(+1)(72 16)   1  s 2
2
9( 2)2(+1)   1  s
PI2;j
42
(+2)2( 4)2   1 
2(22 3 8)2
9(72 16)2   1 2
2
9( 2)2(+1)   1  s
7 In (D,F) equilibrium: wXI3 = w
Y I
2 ; w
Y I
3 = w
XI
2 ; 
U
13 = 
U
22 ; 
U
23 = 
U
12 ; in the upstream industry and
xI13 = y
I
22 ; x
I
23 = y
I
12 ; y
I
13 = x
I
22; y
I
23 = x
I
12; p
XI
3 = p
Y I
2 ; p
Y I
3 = p
XI
2 ; 
DI
13 = 
DI
22 ; 
DI
23 = 
DI
12 in the
downstream industry.
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Table 2A: Equilibrium expressions for all technology states (a single supplier)
Upstream (D,D) Mixed equilibrium (e.g. (F,D))8 (F,F)
wXMj ; w
YM
j

2

2

2
Mj
2
2(+2)
2(+7)
24(+1)
2
3(+1)
Downstream
xM1;j ; x
M
2;j
2
2(+2) ; 0

4(+1) ; 0

6(+1) ;

6(+1)
yM1;j ; y
M
2;j 0;
2
2(+2)
(2 )
12(+1) ;

6

6(+1) ;

6(+1)
pXMj
(+3)
2(+2)
(9 )
12
2
3
pYMj
(+3)
2(+2)
2
3
2
3
PM1;j
2
4(+2)2
  1 2(13 5)144(+1)   1  s 
2
18(+1)   1  s
PM2;j
2
4(+2)2
  1 236   1 
2
18(+1)   1  s
Proof of Lemma 3:
a) Providing that suppliers are independent, consumer surplus is maximized in (F,F) tech-
nology state when the following conditions are satised. First, consumer surplus in mixed
technology state must be lower than consumer surplus in (F,F) technology outcome. This is
true when
CSI4   CSI2  0 and CSI4   CSI3  0 (60)
Second, consumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be higher than consumer surplus in (D,D)
technology state. This is true when
CSI2   CSI1  0 and CSI3   CSI1  0 (61)
Condition (60) can be expressed in the following way:
2(1792  768   8962 + 323   5964 + 2245 + 2676   557)
72( + 1)(   2)2(72   16)2  0 (62)
Similarly, condition (61) can be written as
2(28672 + 18432 + 176642 + 550403 + 237124   161285   94366   11047   2678 + 559)
72( + 1)(   4)2( + 2)2(72   16)2  0
(63)
8 In (D,F) equilibrium: wXM3 = w
YM
2 ; w
YM
3 = w
XM
2 ; 
M
3 = 
M
2 ; in the upstream industry and x
M
13 =
yM22 ; x
M
23 = y
M
12 ; y
M
13 = x
M
22 ; y
M
23 = x
M
12 ; p
XM
3 = p
YM
2 ; p
YM
3 = p
XM
2 ; 
DM
13 = 
DM
22 ; 
DM
23 = 
DM
12 in the
downstream industry.
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It can be shown graphically that both conditions are fullled for the relevant rage of  2 [ 1; 1]
and  > 0.
Q.E.D.
b) Proceeding as above, it is enough to show that two conditions are satised. First, con-
sumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be lower than consumer surplus in (F,F) equilibrium.
This is true when
CSM4   CSM2  0 and CSM4   CSM3  0 (64)
Second, consumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be higher than consumer surplus in (D,D)
equilibrium. This is true when
CSM2   CSM1  0 and CSM3   CSM1  0 (65)
Condition (64) can be expressed as:
72(1  )
288( + 1)
 0 (66)
Similarly, condition (65) can be written as
2(73   192   16 + 28)
288( + 1)( + 2)2
 0 (67)
Both expressions, (66) and (67), are fullled for all values of .
Q.E.D.
c) and d) These results hold when the di¤erence between consumer surplus in (F,F) with
independent suppliers and consumer surplus in the same technology state but with a monopolistic
input market is positive (negative) if products are substitutes (complements). This holds when
CSI4   CSM4  0 (68)
or
2(4  )
9(   2)2(1 + )  0 (69)
for 0    1 and
CSI4   CSM4 < 0 (70)
or
2(4  )
9(   2)2(1 + ) < 0 (71)
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for 0    1. It is straightforward to see that the sign of both inequalities depends on the sign
of  and that both conditions are satised for relevant types of products.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
a) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI1   PSI2  0 and PSI1   PSI3  0 (72)
hold for some value of . PSIj represents total payo¤s of downstream producers given technology
state j and upstream market structure I. Condition (72) is equivalent to
s 
2(239   758   6967 + 15646   54725   222724 + 148483 + 560642 + 18432   4096)
36( + 1)(   4)2( + 2)2(72   16)2  0
(73)
and it can be shown graphically that it holds for some value of  and s. For example, if we set
 = 10 and s = 0:5 then PSI1  PSI2 = PSI3 if  2 [ 0:65; 0:24].
Q.E.D.
b) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI1   PSI4  0: (74)
This can be expressed as
2s  4
2(4   223 + 422 + 32   8)
9( + 1)(   2)2(2   2   8)2  0 (75)
Again, it can be shown that if we set  = 10 and s = 0:5, (75) holds for  2 [ 0:75; 0:32].
Q.E.D.
c) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI4   PSI2  0 and PSI4   PSI3  0 (76)
hold for some . This can be expressed as
 
2(237   756   3285 + 3164 + 9923   4162   768 + 256)
36(1 + )(   2)2(72   16)2   s  0 (77)
Again, by setting  = 10 and s = 0:5 it can be shown graphically that it holds for  2 [0:54; 0:95].
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 5:
a) This result if true when
PSM1   PSM2  0 and PSM1   PSM3  0 (78)
hold for some values of . Inequality (78) can be written as
2(3   132 + 8 + 4)
144(1 + )(   2)2 + s  0 (79)
This holds for positive  and s 6= 0. For example, if  = 10 and s = 0:5 the above expression is
fullled when  2 [ 0:39; 1].
Q.E.D.
b) This result if true when
PSM1   PSM4  0 (80)
is true for some positive values of . Condition (80) can be written as
2s  
2(22      1)
18( + 1)( + 2)2
 0 (81)
Again, it can be shown that for positive  and s 6= 0, the above condition is fullled when
 2 [ 0:55; 1].
Q.E.D.
c) This result if true when
PSM4   PSM2  0 and PSM4   PSM3  0 (82)
is true for some positive values of . Condition (80) can be written as
2(   1)
144( + 1)
  s  0 (83)
Again, it can be shown graphically that for positive  and s 6= 0, the above condition is fullled
for all relevant values of .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove this proposition, it is enough to show that
USM4   USM2  0 and USM4   USM3  0 (84)
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and
USM4   USM1  0 (85)
Inequality (84) is given by
2(1  )
24(1 + )
 0 (86)
and condition (85) can be written as
2(1  )
6(2 + 3 + 2)
 0 (87)
It is straightforward that both are positive for all values of .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to prove this proposition, it is necessary to show that
for some values of  close to 1 total welfare is not maximized when both producers are active
in both markets. Let us rst start with the case in which there are two suppliers. Then the
following conditions must be met:
W I4  W I2  0 and W I4  W I3  0 (88)
and
W I4  W I1  0 (89)
Where W kj represents total welfare given technology state j and sub-game equilibrium k = I;M
where I stands for independent suppliers and M for a single supplier. Condition (88) can is
given by
2(4352  5376   10242 + 26563   14684 + 7365 + 4896   3657)
72(1 + )(32  16   142 + 73)2   s  0 (90)
and (89) can be expressed as
42(2168  2208   9782 + 2383   2734 + 2465   67667)
9(   4)4(1 + )(2   4)2   2s  0 (91)
It can be shown graphically that for positive  and s 6= 0. both conditions are fullled. For
example, if  = 10 and s = 0:5 condition (90) is satised for  2 [ 1; 0:95], i.e. except when
products are strong substitutes. Condition (91) holds for all values of .
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Second, considering the case in which there is a multi-product monopolistic supplier, it is
necessary to show that
WM4  WM2  0 and WM4  WM3  0 (92)
and
WM4  WM1  0 (93)
hold for some values of . Condition (92) can be expressed as
172(1  )
288(1 + )
  s  0 (94)
Similarly, condition (93) is equivalent to
2(17  10   72)
36( + 2)2(1 + )
  2s  0 (95)
Proceeding as above, it can be illustrated that both expressions are fullled for positive  and
s 6= 0. For example, if  = 10 and s = 0:5, (94) holds for  2 [0:84; 1] and (95) holds when
 2 [0:78; 1].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove this proposition, it is necessary to show that, for some
values of , the equilibrium regions of technology choice under a monopolized upstream market
do not overlap with the socially e¢ cient outcomes. Thus, let us start with complementary
products and consider the case of the move from the (D,D) to the mixed technology state. It
can be shown that the condition for a socially e¢ cient adoption of FPT by one producer needs
to satisfy the following inequality:
WM2  WM1  0 and WM3  WM1  0; (96)
which is equvalent to
 
r
s
fMDD2Mix()
; (97)
where
fMDD2Mix() =
(68  80   52 + 173)
288( + 2)2(1 + )
: (98)
From Proposition 1 in section 3, we know that there is a mixed equilibrium for complementary
products when
q
s
fMDD()
  <
q
s
fMFF ()
. Thus, to show that the choice of manufacturers does
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not lead to a socially optimal outcome it needs to be proved that the following condition is met:
fMDD2Mix()  fMDD()  0; (99)
which can be expressed as
(32   5 + 2)
32( + 2)(1 + )
 0: (100)
It can be seen that for complementary products the above condition is always satised. In
other words, there are some values of  in which mixed equilibria would be socially e¢ cient, but
they do not exist, as companies consider such markets as too small.
Second, considering further the case of complementary products, it needs to be shown that,
for some values of , companies do not move from mixed technology equilibria to the (F,F) tech-
nology state, although it would be socially desiarable. The adoption of FPT by both companies
versus only one is socially e¢ cient when:
WM4  WM2  0 and WM4  WM3  0; (101)
which is equvalent to
 
r
s
fMMix2FF ()
; (102)
where
fMMix2FF () =
17(1  )
288(1 + )
: (103)
From Proposition 1 in section 3, we know that there is a (F,F) equilibrium for complementary
products when  
q
s
fMFF ()
. Thus, if the choice of manufacturers does not lead to a socially
optimal outcome the following condition must hold:
fMMix2FF ()  fMFF ()  0; (104)
which can be expressed as
1  
32(1 + )
 0: (105)
Again, it is straightforward that, for complementary products, the above condition is always
satised.
Lastly, it needs to be shown that, for some values of , companies do not move from the
(D,D) equilibrium to the (F,F) technology state, although it would be socially desiarable. The
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adoption of FPT by both companies versus the (D,D) state is socially e¢ cient when:
WM4  WM1  0; (106)
which is equvalent to
 
r
s
fMDD2FF ()
; (107)
where
fM
DD2FF
() =
17  10   72
36(1 + )(2 + )2
: (108)
From Proposition 1 in section 3, we know that both companies choose to invest into FPT when
 
q
s
fMFF ()
. Thus, to show that the choice of manufacturers does not lead to a socially optimal
outcome it needs to be proved that the following condition is met:
fMDD2FF ()  fMFF ()  0; (109)
which can be expressed as
3   42   10 + 13
36(1 + )(2 + )2
 0: (110)
Again, it is easy to see that the above condition is always satised. Concluding, taking into
account that conditions (100), (105) and (110) are satised for the relevant range of , it has
been proved that for some intermediary value of , the decisions of downstream rms deliver
socially ine¢ cient outcomes.
Q.E.D.
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